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The essay is an empirical case study of famed British scientist Francis Crick. Viewing him as a ‘cross-
worlds inﬂuencer’ who was moreover dedicated to a cause, I have tried to understand how these two
characteristics inﬂuenced the trajectory of his long career and how they shaped his contributions to the
diverse research ﬁelds in which he was active, and concluded that these characteristics reconﬁgure
Crick’s career into a coherent whole. First, I identify a major thread running through Crick’s career:
helping organise ‘un-disciplined’ new research ﬁelds, and show that his successive choices were not
serendipitous but motivated by what he construed as a crusade against ‘vitalism’: anti-vitalism was a
deﬁning driver of his career. I then examine how Crick put his skills as a crossworlds inﬂuencer to the
service of his cause, by helping organise his chosen ﬁelds of intervention. I argue that his activities as a
cross-worlds inﬂuencer were an integral part of his way of ‘doing science’ and that his contributions to
science, neuroscience in particular, should be re-evaluated in this light. This leads me to advance a
possible strategy for historians to investigate big bioscience ﬁelds. Following Abir-Am, I propose to trace
their genealogies back to the ﬂuctuating semi-institutional gatherings and the institutional structures
that sustained them. My research on Crick supports the view that such studies can bring insights into the
question of why the contours of contemporary big bioscience endeavours have come to be shaped the
way they are. Further, the essay provides a heuristic device for approaching these enquiries: ‘follow the
cross-worlds inﬂuencers’ who worked to build and organise these semi-institutional gatherings and
institutional structures.
 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).When citing this paper, please use the full journal title Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences1 In the UK, Big Data is a cross-cutting ‘vital part’ of RCUK strategy: http://www.1. Introduction
The unprecedented rise of large-scale, collaborative, multi-
disciplinary ‘Big Science’ projects, in the wake of World War II,
poses new challenges for archivists and historians of science. How
to document them and write their history is much debated. One
prominent difﬁculty is the large number and diversity of the par-
ticipants involved, and the huge mass of data they produce. In our
knowledge economies, humanities are encouraged to follow the
growing trend towards ‘Big Data’ and develop tools andmethods to
exploit the vast volumes of data that ‘Big Science’ and informationLtd. This is an open access articlesociety generate. In history of science as in many other domains,
data-driven research appears as a promising response to the chal-
lenges of the ‘data deluge’ caused by the overabundance of sour-
ces.1 However, this approach does not go unchallenged
(Scheinfeldt, 2012). Indeed, one overarching aim of the collection to
which this essay belongs, is to propose other possible strategies to
ﬁnd a way into, and make sense of, the data-crowded labyrinths of
the contemporary biosciences.rcuk.ac.uk/research/infrastructure/big-data/. For the Arts and Humanities Research
Council (AHRC), the Big Data research programme is at the core of ‘Digital Trans-
formations’, one of the four AHRC strategic themes for 2013e2018: http://www.
ahrc.ac.uk/Funding-Opportunities/Research-funding/Themes/Digital-
Transformations/Pages/Big-Data.aspx. Links were last consulted 12/03/2015.
under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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issue is not somuch the proliferation of sources, as a lack of suitable
narrative models (García-Sancho, 2016). This view is consistent
with that of skeptics in other research ﬁelds who view the
increasingly popular strategy of developing tools and methods for
data-driven research as a substitute for theory-driven research, or,
as the most radical would have it, as a substitute for thinking
(Carandini, 2015; de Chadarevian, 2009; Fisher, 2015). Based on his
experience researching the history of genomics, García-Sancho
proposes to use the administrative archives of big science projects
as alternatives to individual scientists’ papers and to follow “the
synthetic voice of the invisible administrator.” He justiﬁes this
approach on the grounds that “[t]he brokering expertise of big
science administrators, navigating among the many actors involved
in the projects and harmonising their conﬂicting views, constitutes
a privileged point of entrance into the rhizome of genomics.”
(García-Sancho, 2016).
This argument calls for two observations. First, García-Sancho’s
emphasis on the brokering expertise of big science administrators
implies that the value of administrators as entry points into big
science projects depends not so much on their administrative
management skills as on their aptitude at ‘managing by inﬂuence’
across different social worlds. Inﬂuence has been the object ofmuch
attention in the business and management literature, especially in
relation to leadership. Although much of this work has been pub-
lished in the grey literature aimed at managers and top executives,
political communicators, social marketers and the like,2 it has also
found its way into more scholarly publications.3 Here, inﬂuence is
commonly deﬁned as the capacity to affect others’ ideas, opinions
and actions by intangible or indirect means, instead of through
direct authority. Inﬂuence, it is commonly argued, is particularly
important for roles of leadership in environments where the focus
in on strategy and where the best way to accomplish objectives is
through collaboration and persuasion, rather than directive,
bureaucratic management. Major factors in inﬂuence include
commitment to a vision, consistency inmessage, and other people’s
respect for and liking of the inﬂuencer. Of paramount importance is
the ability to build and nurture interpersonal trust relationships, as
a platform for inﬂuence (Cialdini, 2007; Kaufman, 2011).
In his argument, García-Sancho does not disentangle the
distinct roles of the two forms of management, administration and
inﬂuence, in the organisation of interdisciplinary, collaborative
science. This is characteristic of much history and sociology of
science. There have been few attempts to examine how the capacity
to exert inﬂuence across different contexts, what I will term ‘cross-
worlds inﬂuencing,’ contributes to the makeup of science, to the
directions inwhich science develops, its organisation and practices.
Still, there are noteworthy exceptions. The overarching goal of the
collective volume The Brokered World. Go-Betweens and Global In-
telligence, 1770e1820 has been to bring to light “the largely ignored
role of go-betweens in the very construction of [the] modernworld,
notably in the domain of knowledge and sciences.” (Schaffer,
Roberts, Raj, & Delbourgo, 2009) More relevant to our concern
with contemporary big science, Shapin’s study of the post-World
War II scientist as institution builder and entrepreneur has shown
that, in large collaborative and interdisciplinary projects, “the2 See for instance: Cialdini (2007), Grenny, Patterson, Maxﬁeld, McMillan, &
Switzler (2013). http://www.forbes.com/2011/01/03/inﬂuence-persuasion-
cooperation-leadership-managing-ccl.html; https://hbr.org/2008/02/exerting-
inﬂuence-without-aut.html; http://carlsonschool.umn.edu/executive-education/
programs/power-and-inﬂuence. All links last consulted 13/03/2015.
3 See for instance Manning & Robertson (2003), Johnson-Cartee & Copeland
(2004), Hoy & Smith (2007), Manning, Pogson, & Morrison (2008a, 2008b, 2008c),
Kaufman (2011).personal, the familiar, and even the charismatic” are ever more
important to research management; that vision, inspiration, stim-
ulation, encouragement, capacity to relate to various individualities
and diverse research interestsdall qualities that map onto the key
components of inﬂuential leadership highlighted abovedwere far
more importance for the ﬂourishing of such research projects than
well-oiled bureaucratic task management (Shapin, 2008, chapter 6
especially).
The sociology of science has paid some attention to skills rele-
vant to cross-worlds inﬂuencing in relation to multidisciplinary big
science. I have particularly in mind Harry Collins and Robert Evans’
elaboration of the concept of ‘interactional expertise’ in their
Studies of Experience and Expertise programme.4 ‘Interactional
expertise’ was initially conceived in the context of ethnographies of
science and it was deﬁned as “enough expertise to interact inter-
estingly with participants and carry out a sociological analysis” as
opposed to ‘no expertise’ (“insufﬁcient to conduct a sociological
analysis or do quasi-participatory ﬁeldwork”) and ‘contributory
expertise’ (“enough expertise to contribute to the science of the
ﬁeld being analysed”) (Collins & Evans, 2002, p. 254). The concept
was subsequently generalized as “the product of a successful lin-
guistic socialization. Although expressed as language alone, it
cannot be too heavily stressed, interactional expertise is tacit
knowledge-laden and context speciﬁc.” (Collins, Evans, & Gorman,
2007, p. 661). In the Studies of Expertise and Experience pro-
gramme, Collins has qualiﬁed his conception of language as ‘prac-
tice language,’ whose deﬁning feature is “its substantive (often
tacit) content,” and has gone on to reconﬁgure ‘contributory ex-
perts’ as a subset of the class of ‘interactional experts’, further
blurring the roles of language and practice in the deﬁnition of
interactional expertise (Collins, 2011, pp. 274e276). In its extended
version, ‘interactional expertise’ has been recognized as essential to
the coordination of activities in a complex division of labour
(Collins, 2011, p. 284) and it has been presented as a linchpin of
‘fractionated trading zones’, characterized as interdisciplinary
partnership that “involves fractions of cultures as the medium of
interchange . which are mediated by language largely in the
absence of the material” (Collins et al., 2007, p. 660). Multidisci-
plinary and collaborative ‘big science’ ﬁelds are typical instances of
such partnerships.5 Coming back to my concern with cross-worlds
inﬂuencing, interactional expertisedmastery of the tacit knowl-
edge pertaining to a domain of expertisedis a major asset when
engaging with the corresponding specialist community. In the case
of big science projects, an individual who is able to develop inter-
actional expertise in several of the research ﬁelds involved is in a
position to play a privileged role brokering and building trust be-
tween distinct research groups, thus inﬂuencing the shape and
direction of the collaboration. Coming from the sociology of social
networks tradition, Ronald Burt reaches similar conclusions,
arguing that ‘between-group brokers’ who exploit the ‘structural
holes’ in a social network (i.e. brokers lying on weaker connections
between densely clustered groups within the network) play a
special role in generating social capital (Burt, 2001, 2002, 2004). On
these premises, I will propose that beside project administrators, a
wider and more diverse array of ‘cross-worlds inﬂuencers’ are
worth pursuing as privileged ‘entry points’ into big science.4 See in particular, Collins & Evans (2002), Collins et al. (2007), Collins (2011).
5 Even though Collins et al. (2007) point at gravitational waves research as a
typical example, understandably considering the number of years that Collins has
been involved with this ﬁeld, the authors point that “. when examined closely,
what appear to be integrated networks of scientists are really conglomerations of
small groups bound together by rich interactional expertises.” (Collins et al., 2007,
p. 661) The domain of life sciences has proven an excellent candidate for the
development of such ‘big science’ projects, due to complexity of the subject matter.
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rhizome’ of genomics is not free-ﬂoating. To pursue the botanical
metaphor, this complex outgrowth has a speciﬁc genealogy in
which only certain disciplinary lineages are represented, and has
grown out of a speciﬁc terrain. In the early 1990s, Pnina Abir-Am
suggested that historians should focus on “intermediary units of
sociohistorical analysis . collaborative patterns of various dura-
tion, such as research schools, circles, clubs, and other informal
gatherings, which combine a deﬁnable social structure with coor-
dinated research programs”, on the grounds that they were indis-
pensable for understanding the history of many interdisciplinary
ﬁelds in twentieth-century science (Abir-Am, 1991, p. 342). If we
followAbir-Am, the broad category of intermediary analytical units,
of ﬂuctuating collaborative patterns, that she was bringing to
attention were instrumental in creating the sheltered spaces into
which many a 20th-century interdisciplinary research programme
took root, eventually growing into fully-ﬂedged endeavours in ‘big
science’. These gatherings thus deserve attention for the ways in
which they have ‘landscaped’ the grounds and prepared the terrain,
where speciﬁc hybrids (genomics being one of several) took root
and grew while others did not.
A characteristic common to all Abir-Am’s examples of gather-
ings is that they are ‘semi-institutional,’ in the sense that they sit in-
between the public and private spheres: grass-root, co-opted and
often conﬁdential on the one hand; endorsed and supported by
institutions on the other.6 I would argue that their semi-
institutional nature is a salient quality of such gatherings, essen-
tial to the role they have played in the development of 20th-century
life sciences. They were sites where the interpersonal trust re-
lationships required by interdisciplinary collaboration could grow
and deepen in a framework shaped by institutionally-sanctioned
scientiﬁc aims. In this essay, my point is that semi-institutional
gatherings provide privileged playing ﬁelds for cross-worlds
inﬂuencers, offering environments whose informality discourages
directive authority and encourages the building of trust.
The essay is an empirical case study of famed British scientist
Francis Crick. Viewing him as a cross-worlds inﬂuencer who was
moreover dedicated to a cause, I have tried to understand how
these two characteristics inﬂuenced the trajectory of his long career
and how they shaped his contributions to the diverse research
ﬁelds in which he was active: I have reached the conclusion that
these characteristics reconﬁgure Crick’s career into a coherent
whole. First, I identify a major thread running through Crick’s
career: helping organise ‘un-disciplined’ new research ﬁelds, and
show that his successive choices were not serendipitous but
motivated by what he construed as a crusade against ‘vitalism’:
anti-vitalismwas a deﬁning driver of his career. I then examine how
Crick put his skills as a cross-worlds inﬂuencer to the service of his
cause, by helping organise his chosen ﬁelds of intervention. I argue
that his activities as a cross-worlds inﬂuencer were an integral part
of his way of ‘doing science’ and that his contributions to science,
neuroscience in particular, should be re-evaluated in this light.
This leads me to advance a possible strategy for historians to
investigate big science. Following Abir-Am, I propose to trace their
genealogies back to the ﬂuctuating semi-institutional gatherings6 I have borrowed and translated the notion of ‘semi-institutional’ from social
geographer Hester Parr, who has used it in her work on psychiatric-medical care in
Parr (2000) to describe sites of community care which are neither institutional
locations nor free from clinical associations, in-between places “inﬂuenced partially
through grass-roots visions of community inclusion and support, and partially
through state regulation and funding.” In Ilie (2001), linguist Cornelia Ilie has used
the term ‘semi-institutional’ in a related manner, to characterise discourse that
“exhibit[s] a mixture of characteristics pertaining to both casual conversation and
institutional discourse.”and the institutional structures that sustained them. My research
on Crick supports the view that such studies can bring insights into
the question of why the contours of contemporary big science
projects have come to be shaped the way they are.7 Further, the
essay provides a heuristic device for approaching these enquiries:
follow the cross-worlds inﬂuencers who worked to build and
organise these semi-institutional gatherings and institutional
structures.2. A self-constructed ‘anti-vitalist’
In the course of his scientiﬁc career, Francis Crick changed
research ﬁelds several times, from protein crystallography, molec-
ular genetics, developmental cell biology and the chemical origin of
life while at the UK Medical Research Council Laboratory of Mo-
lecular Biology in Cambridge (LMB), to the neuroscience of vision
and the science of consciousness while at the Salk Institute for
Biological Studies in La Jolla, California. This represents not quite
thirty years researching the broad domain of molecular biology and
genetics at the LMB, for over twenty-ﬁve years doing neuroscience
at the Salk Institute.
Mapping the detailed chronology of Crick’s scientiﬁc activities
(Olby, 2009) onto the wider developments of post-World War II life
sciences shows that a deﬁning element of his scientiﬁc career was
that he repeatedly engaged with research ﬁelds when they were
still ﬂedgling scientiﬁc pursuits jostling at the margins of estab-
lished disciplines. He was frank about this. What he was interested
in was to build general theoretical frameworks that would foster
experimental research programmes. And he wanted to do so in
areas of biology that lacked such frameworks because they
revolved around questions that “seemed beyond the power of sci-
ence to explain.” (Crick, 1988, p. 17). Once he deemed that a ﬁeld
was organized enough, scientiﬁcally speaking, he would feel the
urge to turn to another, in need of the lights of science:
“. by 1966, we realized that the foundations of molecular
biology were now sufﬁciently ﬁrmly outlined that they could be
used as a fairly secure basis for the prolonged task of ﬁlling in
themany details. Sydney Brenner8 and I thought that it was time
to move on to new ﬁelds.” (Crick, 1988, p. 144)
By 1966, molecular biology was a far cry from its state in 1947
when Crick had applied to the UK Medical Research Council to
pursue his postgraduate studies in protein crystallography at the
brand new MRC Unit for the Study of the Molecular Structure of
Biological Systems in Cambridgedthe future LMB. At the time, the
unit was housed in the Cavendish Laboratory and counted just two
full time researchers, Max Perutz and John Kendrew (de
Chadarevian, 2002, p. 65); and their research ﬁeld, which was not
yet called ‘molecular biology’, was predominantly practised by
defectors from physics and chemistry and still considered by tra-
ditionalists in the physics and life sciences departments as an up-
start challenger of doubtful promise (for instance, Abir-Am, 1987;
de Chadarevian, 2002; Kay, 1993). This early set-up was a far cry
from the LMB that was to grow out of the MRC Unit, which, in May
2015, counted around ﬁfty research groups.9 Robert Olby’s richly
detailed biography of Crick and Soraya de Chadarevian’s excep-
tionally well documented history of the LMB and of post-World7 Beside the present paper, see Aicardi (2014).
8 For the close collaboration between Sydney Brenner and Crick, which lasted
from 1957 until 1976, see de Chadarevian (2002), Olby (2009).
9 Website of the MRC Laboratory of Molecular Biology: http://www2.mrc-lmb.
cam.ac.uk/group-leaders/, last consulted 03 May 2015.
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Crick actively helped instituting molecular biology into a powerful
scientiﬁc discipline (de Chadarevian, 2002; Olby, 2009). At the LMB,
until 1976 and his move to California, Crick devoted his energies to
helping molecular biology off the ground, consolidating its insti-
tutional foundations, and strengthening its research community.
He also worked assiduously to expand its remit to genetics, cell and
developmental biology, and neurobiology. The sustained diversiﬁ-
cation that Crick and his close collaborator Sydney Brenner
engaged in was remarkable in its breadth, and as de Chadarevian
has pointed out: “[w]hat is surprising is how unproblematic the
expansion of research interest seems to have been.” (de
Chadarevian, 2002, p. 197).
Retrospectively, it is hard to believe that the burgeoning
research ﬁeld which Crick joined in 1947 could have been consid-
ered a ﬂaky pursuit. Yet this is how Brenner recently reminisced
about the era:
“To have seen the development of a subject, which was looked
upon with disdain by the establishment from the very start,
actually become the basis of our whole approach to biology
today. That is something that was worth living for. . What
people don’t realise is that at the beginning, it was just a handful
of people who saw the light, if I can put it that way. So it was like
belonging to an evangelical sect, because there were so few of
us, and all the others sort of thought that there was something
wrong with us. They weren’t willing to believe. . I remember
when going to London to talk atmeetings, people used to askme
what am I going to do in London, and I used to tell them I’m
going to preach to the heathens.”(Dzeng, 2014)
Confrontation with the establishment, misunderstood genius,
are common tropes of scientists’ memories. Still, if we trust de
Chadarevian, it is clear for example that even in the late 1950s,
geneticists had yet to develop a general interest in molecular ge-
netics; and her account of the long and difﬁcult negotiations over
the relocation the expanding lab, between the MRC Unit research
group, the University of Cambridge and the Medical Research
Council, which lasted from 1953 until the move into the new LMB
buildings in 1962, shows that a research group “which showed no
loyalty to a particular discipline” was a thorny issue for the uni-
versity. The latter resisted the researchers’ plans and offered little
cooperation (de Chadarevian, 2002).
Another research ﬁeld in which Crick became involved when it
was still in an embryonic state was the origins of life. For a period of
time between the late 1960s and early 1970s, he collaborated with
theoretical chemist Leslie Orgel, to evaluatewhether it was possible
to attack the question scientiﬁcally. Although their joint inquiry
remained (by their own admission) at the speculative level10 and
their foray into ‘directed panspermia’11 attracted a fair share of
sarcasm from the scientiﬁc establishment (Crick, 1981; Crick &
Orgel, 1973, 1993; Olby, 2009, pp. 369e362; Ridley, 2006, pp.
171e174), Orgel went on to pursue for over thirty years a solid
research programme in exobiology and the chemical evolution of
life, largely funded by NASA.
In 1976, Crick moved to California to join the Salk Institute
and to enter the ﬁeld of neuroscience. He ﬁrst chose to focus on10 Proof that Crick did not take their effort for anything more than speculative, he
sent an advanced draft of their joint paper on “Directed Panspermia” to Jacques
Monod at the Institut Pasteur, writing in the accompanying letter: “As you can see,
it could be classed as Higher Science Fiction.” (Institut Pasteur, Monod archive, Box
MON.Cor.04, Folder ‘Francis Crick’, letter from Crick to Monod, 1st November 1972).
11 The hypothesis that life on earth may have been seeded by microorganisms
originating from other planets and transported through space.the neuroscience of vision, when according to visual psycho-
physicist V.S. Ramachandran, ‘‘Vision seems to be in a state of
confusion similar to pre-DNA molecular biology.”12 Then, from
the late 1980s onward, he turned to the neuroscience of con-
sciousness, at a time when consciousness studies were still seen
as downright unscientiﬁc. Again, Crick invested himself in
organising these new ﬁelds and making them scientiﬁcally
respectable. Describing Crick’s role in transforming the San Diego
area into a hub of neuroscientiﬁc research, Ramachandran has
used a vivid botanical metaphor:
“. he was instrumental in having many of us in neuroscience
and psychology move to La Jolla in the early eighties
dtransforming it into “neuron valley” (He had the foresight to
bring Terry Sejnowski and the Churchlands to UCSD at a time
when the kinds of topics they worked on were not considered
especially fashionable). We all thought of him as a great Sequoia
tree under whose branches many of us saplings eked out a
precarious living.” (Ramachandran, 2004)13
A glaring question at this point is whether Crick’s successive
choices of research ﬁeld were serendipitous or if there was a
common thread uniting them beyond their ﬂedgling state. Ac-
cording to his autobiography, what they had in common was that
they passed the ‘gossip test’, i.e. “. what you are interested in is
what you gossip about,” and they tackled problems which were
deemed by most, under what Crick assumed to be the inﬂuence of
religious dogma, as “. beyond the power of science to explain”
(Crick, 1981, pp. 16e17). Of Molecules and Men, a small and rather
obscure book derived from the John Danz Lectures that Crick was
invited to give at the University of Washington in February and
March 1966, provides a more insightful answer. This series of three
lectures, a much expanded version of the lecture on ‘The Molecular
Basis of Life’ that Crick had given to the Cambridge Humanists in
1963, was entitled ‘Is vitalism dead?’ The resulting book was
literally a manifesto against vitalism (Crick, 1966; pp. ixex; Olby,
2009, p. 325).
Crick was not attempting to develop a deep philosophical
critique of vitalism. Instead, he understood the term in a general
way, as implying “some special force directing the growth or the
behaviour of living systems which cannot be understood by our
ordinary notions of physics and chemistry” (Crick, 1966, p. 16).
According to Crick, vitalism, a doctrine used to explain away
complicated biological phenomena that could not be easily
explained, was not dead. He thought that in fact, in certain areas of
science, vitalism was enjoying a resurgence, of which the book
offered examples. For him, it was a remnant of the moribund “old,
or literary culture, which was based originally on Christian values”
(Crick, 1966, p. 93) and which science was in the process of
uprooting: exact scientiﬁcally acquired knowledge was the enemy
of vitalism. Crick went on to examine the three areas of biology
where, in his opinion, vitalist ideas were still lurking. They turned
out to be precisely the same three broad domains that he was to
research in the course of his career: molecular biology, the origin of
life, and the higher nervous system. He considered the latter to be
the most scientiﬁcally backward: “Here vitalistic ideas not only are12 Wellcome Library, Francis Crick Papers, folder PP/CRI/D/1/5/14, letter Ram-
achandran to Crick, 8 June 1982.
13 This view was widely shared by the scientists from diverse neuroscientiﬁc and
neuroengineering ﬁelds that I interviewed at the Salk Institute and Caltech in the
Autumn of 2012.
14 This extract has been transcribed from the recording kindly provided to me in
the Spring of 2012 by Annette Faux, the LMB archivist.
15 This critique has come not only from theorists of complexity (see for instance,
Amzallag, 2002; Morin, 1990; Prigogine & Stengers, 1979) but also from number of
biologists who have had serious reservations about the deterministic and reduc-
tionist project of molecular biology (see Lewontin, 1992; Rose et al., 1984; Rose &
Rose, 1976).
16 The 1960s saw molecular biologists turning to developmental biology with
ambitious research programmes, like that hatched by Brenner in 1963 through his
conversations with Crick around Caenorhabditis Elegans (de Chadarevian, 1998). As
for the neurosciences, the term ‘neuroscience’ was only coined around 1962 (Rose &
Abi-Rached, 2013), and computational, systems as well as cognitive neuroscience
had still to come into existence.
17 Extract from Dzeng (2014).
18 Although it falls squarely outside the remit of the present paper, I think that the
‘secularly religious’ register of scientiﬁc discourse in 20th and 21st century life
sciences deserves more attention. For instance, see recent posting on The New York
Times website: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/15/opinion/sunday/the-church-
of-ted.html?_r¼1, consulted 15/03/2015.
19 The ‘new biology’ was amply nurtured on both sides of the Atlantic by the
Rockefeller Foundation under the inﬂuence of Warren Weaver, from the 1930s
onwarddbut that’s another story (see in particular Abir-Am, 1987; de Chadarevian,
2002; Gaudillière, 2002; Kay, 1993).
20 Which subtitle is Essay on the natural philosophy of modern biology.
21 Which subtitle is A history of heredity.
22 Monod and Jacob were both Nobel laureates and leading researchers at the
Pasteur Institute in Paris, a well-known stronghold of molecular biology.
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the leading workers in this ﬁeld.”(Crick, 1966, p. 98)
The idea that the struggle against vitalism was the overarching
thread running through Crick’s life is supported by a speech given
by his son Michael at the Francis Crick Memorial service held in
September 2004 at the Salk Institute:
“. what made Francis Crick tick?. Obviously something very
powerful was driving him, but what was it? . My thesis here
today is that Francis’ driving quest was to knock the ﬁnal nails in
the cofﬁn of vitalism. . [Francis] wanted to put these ideas to
bed, ﬁrst of all with the structure of DNA, and then he moved on
to how proteins were synthesized, and then he moved on to cell
biology and how animals grew and so forth. But beside what
Francis called ‘the frontier between the living and the non-
living’, he thought that there were two other pillars that had to
be demolished in order for vitalism to be ﬁnally dead. One was
the origin of life. And Leslie Orgel has beenworking on that for
the last 30 years . So once Francis deemed that the work
achieved in molecular biology had freed the question of ‘what is
life’ from vitalism, and that the question of the origin of life was
in good hands, he then moved on to attack the last pillar that
had to be demolished and that was consciousness. Francis was
a manwhowas trying his whole life to win an argument. I never
understood who he was arguing against but he had this total
conviction that he had to win this argument.”14
Crick’s crusader’s tendencies did not disappear when he moved
on to neuroscience. Ralph Siegel and Ed Callaway, two neurosci-
entists of a younger generation who enjoyed Crick’s support,
described him in their obituary as an “evangelical atheist” who “.
was building an army to help him take on consciousness.” (Siegel &
Callaway, 2004).
Olby, Crick’s ofﬁcial biographer, has also sought to understand
“why Crick was so passionate, and at times, vehement, about the
new knowledge of molecular biology” and why he “assumed the
role of preacher and evangelist.” (Olby, 2009, Preface) Olby’s his-
toriographical approach led him to look for intellectual explana-
tions at the level of the autonomous individual, viewing Crick as a
far-sighted scientist rationally responding to opposition from other
scientists and understanding the potential beneﬁts of this new
science for society (Olby, 2009, Preface). I have adopted a more
sociological perspective, approaching Crick as a social agent best
understood through the roles he played across the social groups he
belonged to; and I have rejected the clean separation between
reason and beliefs, embracing the idea that “[v]isions, images and
beliefs cannot sharply be demarcated from knowledge. Knowing is
inevitably rooted in some set of beliefs.” (Nowotny, Scott, &
Gibbons, 2001, p. 232)
The aim of the historian is to try and understand the past on her
subjects’ own terms. In the case of science, this means projecting
herself back into the ‘now’ that scientists experienced as their work
unfolded over time. In the early stages of a research programme
especially, this implies thinking of science-in-the-making as still
predominantly a matter of beliefs, belonging to the realm of
science-as-it-could-be. Indeed, Crick himself occasionally let slip
that his scientiﬁc certainties amounted to a belief system. Writing
about “the borderline between the living and the nonliving”dthe
subject matter of molecular biologydhe recalled that “[n]ot so
many years ago this seemed inﬁnitely mysterious, and only by a
very considerable act of faith could one believe that an explanation
would be possible in terms of physics and chemistry.” (Crick, 1966,
pp. 16e17). When looking at belief as motive for action, it does not
matter whether or not Crick’s belief in a vitalist threat is historically
supported by evidence. It is beside the point.At the time when Crick wrote Of Molecules and Men, the mo-
lecular vision of life was steadily gaining prominence, with thriving
research centres and a growing number of Nobel laureates. Still, its
dominance over the life sciences was far from complete; and its
worldview, which has been regularly denounced as the unwar-
ranted belief that physico-chemical determinism and reductionism
could address the entirety of life’s phenomena,15 had yet to expand
its realm, to developmental biology, neurobiology, neurophysiology
and the other mind-brain sciences.16 Of Molecules and Men was
Crick’s action plan for eradicating ‘vitalism’, used as a blanket term
for what he viewed as unscientiﬁc, i.e. non-deterministic and non-
reductionist, belief systems. The book even outlined an educational
programme, stipulating that “. all university students should be
taught a subject that might be called ‘The Map of Science’”. An
expected beneﬁt would be to direct young researchers towards
those areas in the “still almost virgin territory” of biology which
remained in need of exploration. Even liberal arts students should
be taught “one particular branch of science in rather more depth.
to give them some insight into science and the scientiﬁc method.”
(Crick, 1966, pp. 94e95) Had Crick had his way, he would have
mass-indoctrinated the younger generations into a broadly posi-
tivist worldview.
The extract from Brenner’s interview quoted earlier17 shows
that a narrow focus at the individual level provides only limited
insight into Crick’s scientiﬁc evangelism. To describe how it felt to
do molecular biology at the LMB in the early days, Brenner
repeatedly resorts to religious metaphors18: “a handful of people
who saw the light”; “belonging to an evangelical sect”; “preach to
the heathens.” All this points to the militant character of a
communal endeavour, which did not involve just Crick and Brenner
but also their associates at the LMB. It was an endeavour shared by
the transnational ‘new biology’ community19 as exempliﬁed by
Jacques Monod’s Chance and Necessity,20 and Francois Jacob’s The
Logic of Life,21 essays that were both published in 1970 and both
much praised and popular among scientists.22 Both attacked
vitalism. Jacob retraced its roots into animism (Jacob, 1970, pp. 48,
264), while Monod dismissed it curtly as a belief that would only
survive for as long as ‘mysteries’ subsist in biology and predicted
that it would make its last but doomed stand on consciousness
(Monod, 1970, p. 47). Monod’s ‘frontiers’dthe ﬁelds of biology
where these mysteries subsistdcoincided with the three areas
identiﬁed by Crick, and his programme to conquer them largely
25 For the present purpose, a usefully synthetic deﬁnition of propaganda, and its
distinction from persuasion, is provided by Johnson-Cartee & Copeland (2004), p. 3:
“Persuasion utilizes messages that tell individuals to adopt a new belief or attitude,
or to engage in a new behaviour for their own personal beneﬁt. . Propaganda, on
the other hand, utilizes messages that tell individuals the attitudes, beliefs, and
behaviours found desirable in their social groups.”
26 On a reﬂexive note about the interplay between historiography and sources, my
interpretation of Crick’s, Jacob’s and Monod’s books as accomplishing militant work
in favour of their positivist and reductionist ideology conﬁrms that as primary
sources, popular science books written by scientists can be read as more than just
science communication but as political manifestos, and as more than itemized
pieces but as part of a consistent body of work produced at the level of a social
group.
27 In Olby (2009), p. 240, Olby argues that Crick’s renown as a skilled lecturer led
to a great number of invitations to give talks, and that for a time he became
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last bastion to falldwould be the mind-brain relationship, and
especially consciousness (Monod, 1970, chapter 8). In fact, the ‘last
frontier’ was how the brain was often characterised by molecular
biologists, and in time many of them went on to research the ner-
vous system and the brain,23 as Crick had already noted with
satisfaction in Of Molecules and Men (Crick, 1966, p. 24). No wonder
then that Crick liked Monod’s book so much that he used it in a
‘sermon’ (his own word, apparently) to the Cambridge Humanists
(Olby, 2009, p. 332).
Save molecular biologists, few in biology still saw vitalismwas a
threat, and agitating its spectre to mobilise researchers around a
physicalist and reductionist worldview irritated some. One was
evolutionary biologist and geneticist Theodosius Dobzhansky, as
testiﬁed by his 1964 address to the American Society of Zoologists:
“. the contest of mechanism versus vitalism has been a dead
issue in biology for at least half a century. To do research for
invalidating vitalism is at present a height of futility. It is not
unlike using heavy artillery to kill mosquitoes.” (Dobzhansky,
1964, p. 446).
Yet historian Robert Bud has shown that in England the debate
between materialists and vitalists was alive and raging through the
1950s and well into the 1960s, with Crick a central ﬁgure in the
ﬁght (Bud, 2013). And Brenner reported in the late 1990s, “[w]hen,
in a conversation with the mathematician, Kurt Gödel, in Princeton
in 1972, I pointed out the nature and the importance of the binding
site, he said: ‘This is the end of vitalism’.” (Bock & Goode, 1998, p.
109)
Meanwhile, in the life sciences, the threat of the molecular
approach to so-called ‘vitalists’ who did not embrace physico-
chemical determinism and reductionism, was becoming much
stronger than the threat of the vitalists to the molecular biologists.
In the early 1960s, many in molecular biology had no qualms about
their colonizing ambitions towards developmental biology and the
nervous system, as shown by a personal note from Brenner to Max
Perutz, Director of the LMB, dated June 1963. The note describes his
and Crick’s ideas for the expansion of the lab’s research activities:
“It is now widely realised that nearly all the ‘classical’ problems
of molecular biology have either been solved or will be solved in
the next decade. . Because of this, I have long felt that the
future of molecular biology lies in the extension of research to
other ﬁelds of biology, notably development and the nervous
system. This is not an original thought, because as you well
know, many other molecular biologists are thinking in the same
way.” (Wood et al., 1988, p. x)24
From around the mid-1970s, when the colonizing enterprise
had progressed much further, some life scientists and social sci-
entists began to denounce materialist reductionism in biology as
ideology, with the negative connotation given to the term by
Marxist theory (Lewontin, 1992; Rose, Lewontin, & Kamin, 1984;
Rose & Rose, 1976).23 See for instance Brenner (2001), pp. 120e121.
24 Wood et al. (1988), pp. ixexii: The source for Brenner’s memorandum is a
commemoration book that was edited by ‘the Community of C. elegans Researchers’
over two decades after the launch of the research programme, to celebrate its
outstanding success and “. be the sourcebook of the worm for some time to
come.” Brenner reproduced it alongside excerpts from the October 1963 proposal to
the MRC, in annex to his Foreword to the volume. As commemoration work, it ﬁts
well with Abir-Am’s historical analysis of the socio-political dimension of
commemorative practices in molecular biology, in Abir-Am (1999).When examining Monod’s and Jacob’s books alongside Of
Molecules and Men, and Brenner’s imperialist push, vitalism ap-
pears to have been a straw man, whose convenient fuzziness
made it possible to amalgamate several targets under a single
umbrella. Taken together, these books have much in common with
propaganda,25 accomplishing complex militant work not only
against the authority of religion over certain subjects, but also
against that of the humanities and classic biology.26 In scientiﬁc
circles, Crick’s book was much less successful than Jacob’s and
Monod’s, but he compensated by doing what he did best,
exploiting the credit and stature that his Nobel Prize had brought
him to lecture far and wide on behalf of the ‘new biology’ and
against the spectre of ‘vitalism’,27 in fact, taking on so many en-
gagements that the intense travel and overwork took their toll on
his health.28 On a reﬂexive note about the interplay between
historiography and sources, my interpretation of Crick’s, Jacob’s
and Monod’s books as accomplishing militant work in favour of
their positivist and reductionist worldview suggests that when
historians use popular science books by scientists as primary
sources, they should read them not just as science communication
but as political manifestosdcomponents in a consistent body of
work produced by a speciﬁc social group.29
The manner in which these molecular biologists constructed
vitalism as an outdated yet enduring nuisance ripe for eradication
has much in common with the way movement organizers use
collective action and framing to mobilise support, as described by
social movement theory (Crossley, 2002; Snow, Rochford, Worden,
& Benford, 1986; Tarrow, 1998). It even has the same emotional
dimension (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2004; Tarrow, 1998). I
captured an echo of thisdan inkling of the surprising endurance
of the ‘vitalist’ feuddwhen in 2008 I sat in on a keynote lecture
given by a dyed-in-the-wool synthetic biologist to an audience of
Artiﬁcial Life researchers: he ﬁnished his address saying that there
was an obvious conclusion to be drawn from biologists’ failure to
deﬁne life and that is, that there is no such thing, “. life is just a
term for poets, not scientists. There are only replicators with
different degrees of complexity. P.S.: Many of you are closet vi-
talists.”30 Indeed, Brenner, interviewed by de Chadarevian well
into the 2000s, still sanctioned the political nature of the molec-
ular biology enterprise:something of a “traveling speaker; he played the role of molecular evangelist for the
new science.”
28 In 1971 he had to wind down on doctor’s orders and get some rest, as he
explained to Monod in a letter (Institut Pasteur, Monod archive, Box MON.Cor.04,
Folder ‘Francis Crick’, letter from Crick to Monod, 29 November 1972).
29 The case of Of Molecules and Men shows that disregarded popular science pieces
can bring insights for understanding scientists’ lives that their professional papers
would not necessarily yield.
30 Keynote lecture given on 7 August 2008 at ALIFE XI conference (Chichester, UK).
31 The ﬁrst names refer to James Watson, Sydney Brenner, Leslie Orgel and
Christof Koch.
32 Wellcome Library, Francis Crick Papers, folder PP/CRI/L/7/8.
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call a program, but what I call a manifesto. What was the
manifesto of molecular biology? Its manifesto was that we can
explain biological behaviour through the properties of the large
molecules within [cells], mainly the nucleic acids and proteins.
That was the manifesto. . And basically, we haven’t yet
completed that program. . The manifesto is still here.” (de
Chadarevian, 2009)
A remaining question is how Crick’s efforts to organise neuro-
science from the late 1970s onward, relate to his ‘anti-vitalist’
crusade. In Crick’s as in Monod’s discourse, the mind-brain, espe-
cially consciousness, was one of three areas of biology where
‘vitalism’ was supposedly still lurking and the one they expected to
be conquered last. Through his self-constructed anti-vitalism, Crick
was essentially promoting a reductionist, physicalist and deter-
ministic approach to living phenomena, a distinct worldview that
was still an integral part of his later framings of the mind and of
consciousness, as is evident for instance in his 1994 book The
Astonishing Hypothesis, whose opening sentence states that “ ‘You’,
your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions,
your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more
than the behaviour of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their
associated molecules. As Lewis Carroll’s Alice might have phrased
it: ‘You’re nothing but a pack of neurons’” (Crick, 1994, p. 3). Or as
Crick wrote with Christof Koch, outlining the research programme
that he would pursue to the end of his life: “We suggest that the
time is now ripe for an attack on the neural basis of consciousness.
Moreover, we believe that the problem of consciousness can, in the
long run, be solved only by explanations at the neural level.” (Crick
& Koch, 1990).
Having described Crick’s dedication to organising ‘un-disci-
plined’ research ﬁelds still in their infancy and his crusade against
vitalism, I will now turn to the way he deployed his skills as a cross-
worlds inﬂuencer to achieve his aims.33 National Archives, MRC papers, staff ﬁle FD 21/13 Crick, DR F.H.C., ‘Application
for MRC Studentship’, attached with Crick’s CV to memorandum by Edward Mel-
lanby dated July 7, 1947.
34 The importance of brokerage for bottom up interdisciplinary projects has also
been recognised from a science policy studies perspective, like in Corley, Boardman,
& Bozeman (2006).3. A cross-worlds inﬂuencer at work
3.1. The importance of bridging ﬁelds
On May, 1998 Crick gave the Walter Heiligenberg Memorial
Lecture at the UCSD 098 Neuroscience Retreat, entitling his talk, ‘My
Life in Science’. According to his handwritten notes, he planned to
conclude thus:
“Finish: Two General Remarks:
1. Importance of close collaboration (e.g. Jim, Sydney, Leslie,
Christof).31
2. How to bridge ﬁelds, e.g. protein chemistry and genetics, now:
neuroscience and consciousness.”32
Crick’s close collaborations are well known and documented
(see especially, Brenner, 2001; Crick, 1988, 1994; Koch, 2012; Olby,
1974; Olby, 2009; Watson, 1968). Indeed, the collaboration with
James Watson, which led to the elucidation of the double-helix
structure of DNA in the spring of 1953, has acquired near-
legendary status. His emphasis on bridging ﬁelds, which he puts
on the same level of retrospective importance as his close collab-
orations, is more unexpected, and shows his appreciation of the
major role it played in his career.
I have already shown that Crick had a distinct predilection for
research ﬁelds that were still in their infancy. These ﬂedgling sci-
entiﬁc pursuits were inter-disciplinary in the literal sense of the
word. Every new ﬁeld he entered, be it ‘the frontier between theliving and the nonliving’, the origin of life, or consciousness and the
mind, raised questions that could not be tackled from within a
single existing discipline. None had developed credible theoretical
frameworks for addressing the questions it raised. In each case, the
only way to build such frameworks would be to bring together
different strands of research, many of them still in the bud.
Throughout his scientiﬁc life, in England and in California, Crick
built bridges not just between disciplines but also between ex-
perimentalists and theoreticians, making it possible to build broad
theoretical frameworks ﬁrmly grounded in experimental work.
This is a second major thread that runs through his life. It is also an
exemplary display of cross-worlds inﬂuencing. What follows will
highlight the eminently political nature of the work of the cross-
world inﬂuencer, as the ‘bridging’ that Crick practiced involved
carefully selecting the strands of research that he wished to bring
together, overcoming insularity by cherry-picking young individual
researchers for their openness to interdisciplinary collaboration,
and acting as their protector and mentor.3.2. Molecular biology and the LMB
That Crick perceived bridging ﬁelds as necessary to address the
questions hewas attracted to was already evident in his application
for an MRC postgraduate studentship in July 1947. Explaining that
he wished to enter biophysics to pursue his interest in “the division
between the living and the non-living,” he wrote:
“It is clear that problems of this difﬁculty and complexity cannot
hope to yield to any single form of attack; not only must a va-
riety of methods belonging to any single science be employed.
but also a variety of branches of sciences. . So wide, indeed is
the range of scientiﬁc disciplines involved that it is bound to be
impossible for anyone to achieve the degree of mastery in all of
them which comes from working directly in a subject. What is
required, rather, is:
(a) A general knowledge of these related sciences, sufﬁcient to
enable one to appreciate the advantages and limitations of
their methods, and the signiﬁcance of current work.
(b) A thorough grounding in at least one science. In my case this
would of course, be physics; but I realise that this would have
to be extended in the direction of physical chemistry.”33
If we trust his autobiographical recollections, he was aware that
pitching his project in thismanner could turn the liability of his lack
of specialized expertise into an asset: “I took stock of my qualiﬁ-
cations.. Only gradually did I realise that this lack of qualiﬁcation
could be an advantage. By the time most scientists have reached
age thirty, they are trapped by their own expertise.. I, on the other
hand, knew nothing, except for a basic training in somewhat old-
fashioned physics and mathematics and an ability to turn my
hand to new things.” (Crick, 1988, pp. 16e17)
The skills that Crick outlined in his MRC application, i.e. having
enough knowledge of relevant ﬁelds of research to understand the
gist of their work and methods, are akin to ‘interactional exper-
tise’.34 And judging from Crick’s 1947 application to the MRC, the
research programmes that he had in mind to address the questions
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zones,’ whose coordination requires ‘interactional expertise’ (see
Introduction). The bridging role Crick was putting himself up for
ﬁtted the proﬁle of the ‘interactional expert’. He would hone its
characteristic skills for the rest of his life. For instance, his strategy
for approaching and eventually recruiting into new ﬁelds always
included extensive reading.35 It was a reaching out strategy: he
would not start interacting with researchers in a given ﬁeld before
he felt that he had mastered enough of their ‘language’ and ﬁgured
out which problemsmattered to them. Then hewould engage them
in extensive discussions, visit their labs and eventually become a
participating witness of their experiments. Also characteristic was
his ability to change registers depending on his audience, not only
‘talking the talk’ speciﬁc to different research ﬁelds, but also
wearing the experimenter’s cap when talking to theoreticians and
vice-versa.36
The double-helix structure of the DNA, which earned Crick,
JamesWatson andMauriceWilkins the Nobel Prize in Physiology or
Medicine in 1962, has become a popular icon that has been
appropriated for various ends (for instance, de Chadarevian, 2002,
chapter 6)dso famous, in fact, that it has eclipsed the fame of its
authors. In the case of Crick, some have judged that even if he
struck gold with DNA, it was just a ‘ﬂash in the pan’ (Olby, 2009, p.
257). I will argue, on the contrary, that the discovery of DNA is
emblematic of Crick’s lifelong dedication to building bridges be-
tween ﬁelds, since as Sahotra Sarkar has pointed out, “[w]hat is
remarkable about the double-helix model is that. it is a conﬂuent
model (standing at the conﬂuence of four different research pro-
grams).” (Sarkar, 2005, p. 22)
Crick did not limit himself to playing the ‘interactional expert’ or
to bridging ﬁelds in an ad hoc manner. He also realised the impor-
tance of shaping strong institutional bases in which the interdisci-
plinary collaborations that he was aiming for could take root and
ﬂourish. Historians of science have shown that laboratories can be
read as embodiments of a moral economy: an ethos, the values and
virtues of a community, its modes of recruitment and enculturation
(see for instance, Daston, 1995; Kohler, 1994). This is how I conceive
institution-building. Proposing that Crickwas an institution-builder
may sound surprising, since he was reputedly a man who disliked
managerial positions and administrative chores.37 Yet there are
different ways to contribute to building research institutions. One is
to work, not through the exercise of direct administrative and hi-
erarchical power, but by inﬂuencing.
In the course of his professional career, Crick was involved with
two major research institutions, the LMB and the Salk Institute. The
ﬁrst he joined in 1949 when it was still the MRC Unit, housed at the
Cavendish Laboratory and counted four researchers, himself
included (he was a doctoral student there). When he left in 1976, it
had developed into the ‘new LMB’ with four research divisions
housed in a purpose-built building on the site of the old Adden-
brooke hospital. From 1957 onwards, Crick was one of ﬁve scientists
actively involved in negotiating the conditions of the move and the35 His extensive reading has been widely remarked upon by his ex-colleagues and
collaborators that I have interviewed, and is also a trait of his personality that Olby
has put forward in his biography of Crick, in Olby (2009).
36 This is for instance apparent when contrasting the empirical chapter he co-
authored for the largely theoretical Parallel Development Processing. Explorations
in the Microstructure of Cognition, vol. 1: “Foundations” (McClelland & Rumelhart,
1986), with the theoretical “Framework for Consciousness” that he co-authored
with Christof Koch (Crick and Koch (2003)).
37 This is well documented in Olby (2009), and has been unanimously conﬁrmed
by those who worked with him.
38 LMB Archive, File ‘Laboratory of Molecular Biology, Establishment
ofdMemorandum to MRC’. See also de Chadarevian (2002), chapter 7.constitution of the new laboratory. Once the LMB had moved into
its new buildings, Crick wielded not only inﬂuence, but actual
decision-making power. With Brenner, he co-directed one of the
four divisions (apparently leaving to Brenner the bulk of the
administrative management work), and was one of the handful of
individuals on the Governing Board. This part of the history of the
LMB, and Crick’s role in it, has been masterfully recounted by de
Chadarevian and I can only point the reader to her work, which
shows the importance of Crick’s contribution to building-up the
LMB over the ﬁrst twenty-ﬁve years of its existence (de
Chadarevian, 2002).
Still, I will add a couple of remarks. The ﬁrst concerns an extract
from the Memorandum for ‘A Laboratory of Molecular Biology’
presented late 1957 to the MRC, reproduced by de Chadarevian.
This programmatic document, co-signed by Crick and Perutz, made
the case for the expansion of the lab and outlined the desirable
proﬁle of a candidate to address “the division between the living
and the non-living”:
“What sort of people work in Molecular Biology? Broadly two
types of persons can be distinguished. Themain body of workers
consists of people who are specialists in one small part of the
ﬁeld, and who mainly see the problem from that angle. This is
not very satisfactory. . In recent years there has grown up a
small but increasing group of ﬁrst-class workers who under-
stand the subject as a whole, and are prepared, irrespective of
their original training, to learn and to produce new techniques
to solve the problem before them.”38
The passage shows that what Crick had outlined in his 1947MRC
application, turning the liability of his non-specialization into an
asset, had by now become a cardinal virtue for the ideal LMB
scientist.
My second remark is that Crick was concerned not just with
institution building but also with the creation of an international
network of ‘like-minded’ institutions, which strengthened the
infrastructure in which his chosen research ﬁelds could prosper.
This is shown clearly by the way he approached the French mo-
lecular biologists at the Institut Pasteur.
In April 1955, Crick wrote a handwritten note to “Dear Professor
Monod”, to ask if he could take the opportunity of an upcoming
private trip to Paris with his wife, to make his acquaintance. From
there he plunged into a scientiﬁc discussion of a recent paper of
Monod’s, emphasizing how part of Monod’s line of thinking
appeared similar to ideas he himself had been working on. He
concluded by saying that their travel dates were not yet ﬁxed, and
could thus be adapted to suit Monod. In short, he was organising
the trip for the main purpose of getting acquainted with Monod,
andwas willing to set the dates accordingly. Monod agreed, and the
meeting developed into plans for “a completely informal depart-
mental seminar” to be given by Crick (in English not French, for
which he apologised) to the Pasteurians in May 1955.39 Monod’s
feedback on the encounter to his friend and colleague Melvin Cohn
was eloquent: he had been bowled over by Crick, who he described
as probably the most brilliant person he had met since Joshua
Lederberg, and that they had talked for two entire days of proteins’
structure and diverse forms of ‘template hypothesis.’4039 Pasteur Institute Archive, Jacques Monod Archive, Boxes MON.Cor.04, Folder
‘Crick, Francis’.
40 “Nous avons eu, il y a quinze jours, la visite de Francis Crick qui m’a com-
plètement séduit. C’est probablement le garçon le plus brillant que j’ai rencontré
depuis JosheLederberg. Nous avons parlé deux jours de suite de structure de
protéines et de diverses formes de ‘template hypothesis’. ” (Pasteur Institute
Archive, Jacques Monod Archive, Boxes MON.Cor.03, Folder ‘Cohn, Melvin’).
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call sales pitch, and there can be little doubt that his inﬂuencing
skills had been nurtured by the social milieu in which he grew
upda world of ‘in trade’ middle-class entrepreneurs (Olby, 2009).
Be that as it may, the interpersonal relationships that he created
through his social skills41 would initiate the development of a
strong, long-lasting and productive relationship between the LMB
and the Institut Pasteur.3.3. The Salk Institute
The second institution that Crick was involved with in the
course of his career was the Salk Institute, and his involvement
was not only very much upstream, as in the case of the LMB, but
also lasted much longerdforty years in total. The Salk Institute
was the brainchild of Jonas Salk, who had made his fortune and
reputation from the ﬁrst commercially viable inactivated polio
vaccine in the 1950s. Instituted as a legal entity in December 1960,
it was intended as an independent, not-for-proﬁt, interdisciplinary
research institution.42 Building work started in 1962 and the ﬁrst
laboratory opened in the spring of 1963, in the same timeframe as
the new LMB. From the fall of 1961, when the Salk Institute still
existed only on paper, Jonas Salk appointed Crick, Monod,43 Sal-
vador Luria, Leo Szilard, followed by Warren Weaver a few months
later, as the ﬁrst Non-Resident Fellows. These could have been
more or less honorary positions, allowing the institute to beneﬁt
from the considerable weight of the new Fellows’ reputations.
Instead, they were asked to help shape it by advising on the choice
of candidates to appoint as Resident Fellows and more generally
on its scientiﬁc governance. They took their task seriously.44 Crick
completed two six-year terms as Non-Resident Fellow, spending
as long as a month there each year around the time of the annual
Fellows Meeting, usually in late winter or in spring. He stepped
down in 1973, only to come back as visiting fellow in 1975e1976
before moving there permanently in 1976 as J.W. Kieckhefer
Distinguished Research Professor,45 the ﬁrst and last member of
the Faculty who was not expected to run a lab.46 He remained
actively involved in the scientiﬁc governance of the institute until
his death in 2004.41 Crick’s approach has many similarities with the brokering between ‘trust
networks’ that has been described by political sociologist Charles Tilly, in Tilly
(2005).
42 Salk’s initial plan was to push interdisciplinarity beyond the ‘two cultures’
divide and bring together the life sciences and humanities, a plan that did not
survive the 1970s. On the humanities programme at the Salk Institute, see Aronova
(2012).
43 My personal research into the individual records of Crick and Monod (Pasteur
Institute Archive, Jacques Monod Papers, ‘Relations of Jacques Monod with the Salk
Institute’ (Boxes MON.Ins.05 and MON.Ins.06); Wellcome Library, Francis Crick
Papers, ‘Salk Institute for Biological Studies 1953e2004’ (Series PP/CRI/C)) has led
me to conclude that this joint appointment did much to tighten the connection
between the LMB and Institut Pasteur in various ways, and expand it into
California.
44 This assessment is based on my personal research into the Salk Institute ﬁles in
Jonas Salk papers, as well as into the individual records of Crick and Monod: UCSD
Library, Mandeville Special Collections, Jonas Salk papers, Salk Institute Files (MSS1
Series 6); Pasteur Institute Archive, Jacques Monod Archive, ‘Relations of Jacques
Monod with the Salk Institute’ (Boxes MON.Ins.05 and MON.Ins.06); Wellcome
Library, Francis Crick Papers, ‘Salk Institute for Biological Studies 1953e2004’ (Se-
ries PP/CRI/C).
45 Interestingly, Crick’s correspondence regarding the negotiations of the Kieck-
hefer professorship were in his private papers, not his professional papers, which is
evidence that sensitive professional correspondence will not necessarily end up in a
scientist’s professional papers (UCSD Library, Mandeville Special Collections, MSS
660, Box 13, folders 10).
46 See Olby (2009); it has been conﬁrmed by long-standing members of Faculty at
the Salk Institute.Recruitment in research institutions is closely associated with
the development of their research programmes. As such, it was a
focus of Crick’s attention and an area inwhich he came to exert a lot
of inﬂuence, to the point that he became very much used to having
his ownway.47 My ﬁrst example of Crick’s inﬂuence concerns Leslie
Orgel. I have already mentioned their collaboration in the late
1960s and early 1970s, when they worked together on issues
connected to the origin of life, and described how Orgel went on to
pursue a solid thirty year research programme in exobiology and
the chemical evolution of life. Orgel joined the Salk Institute as
Resident Fellow in September 1964 and remained there until his
death in 2007; yet, in 1963, when he wanted to change ﬁelds and
resign from his post as reader in the Department of Organic
Chemistry in Cambridge, England, it was not the ﬁrst institution he
considered. At the time, he seriously envisioned joining the ‘new
LMB’ crew, who were already making plans for an extension of the
laboratory. Orgel was very interested, and his application to the
Medical Research Council highlighted that his “interest in molec-
ular biology has arisen largely through collaborationwith members
of the MRC group, particularly Dr. Crick.” He wished “to extend and
continue that collaboration.”48 Perutz, Sanger, Crick and Kendrew
all supported the idea; and Perutz, as Director of the LMB, was the
spokesperson in the negotiations with the MRC, which started in
April 1963. But over the following months the negotiations
lingered, the MRC being well disposed towards the LMB’s extension
plans but less towards Orgel. Meanwhile, Orgel himself was
receiving attractive offers from institutions in the United States, and
could not put them on hold indeﬁnitely.49 Thus, in November 1963,
Crick, whowas keen to keep Orgel and his proposed line of research
in his sphere of inﬂuence, approached Jonas Salk with a request
that Orgel be ofﬁcially considered for a post at the Salk Institute.
Crick pointed that Orgel had to make a decision by early March
1964, and suggested that he could be invited to visit in February at
the same time as the Fellows’ annual meeting.50 In her account of
the early years of the Salk Institute, molecular biologist Suzanne
Bourgeois has stressed Orgel’s recruitment, with the speciﬁc
strands of research that he brought over and developed, was to
have a great impact on the future of the institute (Bourgeois, 2013,
p. 121).
3.4. Neuroscience
In the same letter to Salk, in November 1963, Crick made a
second suggestion that would have a great impact on the future
development of the institute.51 In view of discussions around the
institute’s next appointments, he expressed the view that along
with embryology, the higher nervous system was an important
ﬁeld, and since “not one of the Fellows is especially well-
informed about either of these ﬁelds,” it would be good to have
people talk to them on these topics on the occasion of the
forthcoming Fellows Meeting in February 1964. He suggested47 This was conﬁrmed by several of the still active scientists that I have inter-
viewed at the Salk Institute in the Autumn of 2012. Some emphasized the point by
using as counterexample the one memorable time in the early 1990s when he
didn’t succeed in getting a particular neuroanatomist hired (Thomas Albright,
personal communication, 02/10/2012; Charles Stevens, personal communication,
26/09/2012).
48 LMB Archives, File ‘1st extension’, document ‘Experimental Approaches to the
Problem of Biogenesis by Leslie Orgel’.
49 The correspondence between the LMB and the MRC, memorandums of the
MRC, internal memorandums of the LMB, and the various stages of the proposal, are
in LMB Archives, File ‘1st extension’.
50 Wellcome Library, Francis Crick Papers, PP/CRI/C/2/1/1, letter from Francis Crick
to Jonas Salk, November 25, 1963.
51 Again conﬁrmed by Bourgeois, in Bourgeois (2013), p. 121.
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added that, “In addition I should like to make a strong case for
inviting David Hubel of the Harvard Medical School.”53 Crick was
very impressed by the papers Hubel and Wiesel had recently
published on the visual system of the cat and was engrossed at
the time in reading in that area.54 The presentations were very
successful, and led to a decision to expand the Salk Institute into
the area of brain research. How neurobiology came to be inte-
grated into the Salk Institute’s research agenda is a complicated
story, largely driven by the institute’s ﬁnancial difﬁculties, that
deserves a detailed treatment in its own right. Sufﬁce to say that
the ﬁrst actual appointment came only in 1970, with Roger
Guillemin, who focused on the chemistry of the brain rather than
its physiology, which was Crick’s main interest.
When Crick joined the institute in 1976, neuroscience research
there still focused exclusively on the lower levels of the brain
(molecular and intra-cellular mechanisms), largely from a
biochemical perspective. But by the end of the 1970s, when he
became active in the neuroscience of vision, Crick had become
convinced that although understanding the ‘structural imple-
mentation’ of the mind (i.e. the lower levels of the brain structure)
was paramount, addressing higher cognitive functions would
require an integrated approach that linked the molecular, cell,
systems, and cognitive levels. This was reﬂected in the computa-
tional approach, strongly inspired by the ideas of David Marr,55
which Crick detailed in a successful grant application to the Sys-
tems Development Foundation in 1982. At the time, the computa-
tional approach was certainly not mainstream (Aicardi, 2014), and
Crick set out to attract younger researchers to the Salk Institute and
to nearby institutions like UCSD, who he thought were outstanding
in their respective areas and also good candidates for interdisci-
plinary collaborations.56
Crick developed a solid relationship with computational
neuroscientist57 Terrence Sejnowski, whom he met as a young
postdoc in Stephen Kufﬂer’s Department of Neurobiology at Har-
vard, around 1981.58 Crick did not take seriously “the computa-
tional types. if they didn’t have a foot in biology”, but Sejnowski
belonged to this rare breed of computational neuroscientists who
also knew some biology.59 After a ﬁrst attempt to recruit him in
1982, he eventually joined the Salk Institute faculty in 1988.6052 Researcher in neuropsychology and neurobiology, famous for his split-brain
experimental work.
53 Wellcome Library, Francis Crick Papers, PP/CRI/C/2/1/1, letter from Francis Crick
to Jonas Salk, November 25, 1963.
54 See for instance Brenner’s testimony, in Brenner (2001). Hubel’s and Wiesel’s
research on the visual system of the cat won them the Nobel Prize in 1981, jointly
with Sperry.
55 Marr’s ideas were about to be published posthumously in his book Vision,
which was to become one of the landmarks of computational neuroscience (see
Marr, 1982).
56 See quote from Ramachandran (2004) in Section 2: “. he was instrumental
in having many of us in neuroscience and psychology move to La Jolla in the
early eightiesdtransforming it into “neuron valley” (He had the foresight to
bring Terry Sejnowsky and the Churchlands to UCSD at a time when the kinds of
topics they worked on were not considered especially fashionable). We all
thought of him as a great Sequoia tree under whose branches many of us saplings
eked out a precarious living.” Also quote from Siegel & Callaway (2004), in
Section 3: Crick was an “evangelical atheist” who “. was building an army to
help him take on consciousness.” For more on Crick’s plans for neuroscience, see
Aicardi (2014).
57 The term ‘Computational neuroscience’ had not yet been coined, it would be a
few years later only around 1985 (see Aicardi, 2014).
58 Kufﬂer had set up at Harvard one of the very ﬁrst Departments of Neurobiology,
in 1966.
59 Thomas Albright, personal communication, 02/10/2012.
60 Wellcome Library, Francis Crick Papers, under PP/CRI/D and PP/CRI/J: ‘Corre-
spondence: S’ folders from 1978 to 1981 to 2002e2003.At a meeting of the Neuroscience Research Program, in the early
1980s,61 Crick promoted the beneﬁts of moving to Southern Cali-
fornia to Charles ‘Chuck’ Stevens, already a well-established
neurobiologist.62 Crick was trying to entice him to move to the
San Diego area in the eventuality that he considered leaving Yale. In
October 1985, he invited Stevens to spend a week at the Salk Insti-
tute, using the Visitor Program funded by his 1982 grant from the
Systems Development Foundation.63 Discontented with Yale, Ste-
vens agreed to join the Salk Institute in 1988 or 198964 and moved
there in 1990.65 Neuro-philosopher Pat Churchland, a close asso-
ciate of Crick who moved to UCSD with her husband Paul Church-
land in 1984,66 has conﬁrmed that for Crick, getting Sejnowski and
Stevens to Southern California was part of a deliberate plan:
“. he and I agreed that whatever it took, we had to get Terry
here. And. of course it was a brilliant decision. This was partly
because, Terry had an awesome breadth of knowledge in
neuroscience as well as inventive computational ideas that were
necessary to begin to make causal sense of how the brain does
the things it does. Moreover, I think Terry more than anybody
else in the San Diego areae on the mesa, as we like to sayewas
instrumental in bringing people together and getting people to
work together, and then starting groups, and starting institutes,
and he is just a genius at getting funding. The upshot was that a
strong community developed with a productive spirit of colle-
giality. So, yes, getting Terry to San Diego was the best thing in
the world for the Salk, not to mention for neuroscience at UCSD,
at that time. Convincing Chuck Stevens to move to the Salk was
Francis’ next big project. And I remember Francis and I were
attending a meeting near Harvard in Cambridge, and we went
for a walk in the park during the lunch break. He was very direct
about the plan; he said, now we have to hire Chuck Stevens at
the Salk. Of course I was only an adjunct at the Salk, but I did
help in whatever ways I could. And of course Chuck was a
tremendous addition, both because of his brilliance as a scien-
tist, but also because of his generous social nature, and his
famously good judgment.”67
Recruited in 1987, Thomas Albright, whose research focuses on
the visual system, thus summarized Crick’s efforts:
“By the time I was here, [Francis] had an enormous inﬂuence
over the direction of neuroscience at the Institute. I mean, there
was . this molecular neuroscience group here, that had been
here for some time. Francis didn’t pay much attention to that.
Francis wanted to see people working on big systems in the
brain. So he pushed for the development of [our] group.”6861 Crick had become became an Active Associate of the NRP in the late 1970s,
and remained an involved and regular attendant of its Stated Meetings even after
his transfer to Honorary Associate status in 1989 at the end of his term, until
2003 (Wellcome Library, Francis Crick Papers (PP/CRI): there are many folders
related to Crick’s involvement with the NRP, containing some correspondence as
well as programmes for the Stated Meetings of the NRP Associates that he
attended regularly from the time he became an Active Associate in 1978 until the
2000s.) The NRP was typical of the kind of interdisciplinary semi-institutional
gathering that Crick favoured for the potential it offered to his ‘inﬂuencing’
activities.
62 Stevens has made especially notable contributions to understanding the mo-
lecular basis of synaptic transmission.
63 For more on the SDF grant, see Aicardi (2014): it was also used to bankroll the
Helmholtz Club in its early years.
64 When I interviewed him he did not remember the exact year.
65 Charles Stevens, personal communication, 26/09/2012.
66 They are known in particular for their ideas of ‘eliminative materialism.’
67 Pat Churchland, personal communication, 05/10/2012.
68 Thomas Albright, personal communication, 02/10/2012.
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ﬂavour of the way Crick used appointments to inﬂuence the
development of neuroscientiﬁc research at the Salk Institute. Today,
the institute counts nine laboratories which together cover all the
brain’s different levels of biological organization.69 Stevens heads
theMolecular Neurobiology Laboratory.70 Albright is Director of the
Vision Center Laboratory and Conrad T. Prebys Chair in Vision
Research.71 Sejnowski is Director of the Crick-Jacobs Center for
Computational and Theoretical Biology and Francis Crick Chair of
Computational Neuroscience, as well as Director of the Institute for
Neural Computation at UCSD,72 and he leads the Salk Institute’s
participation in President Obama’s BRAIN project, launched in
2013.73
But Crick’s role in the establishment of a robust and multi-
stranded neuroscience research base at the Salk Institute was not
limited to inﬂuencing recruitment. He was also very generous with
his ideas and kept suggesting newones to pursue, occasionally with
insistence, to the circle he had helped bring together. Ed Callaway,
neuroanatomist and head of the Organization and Function of
Cortical Circuits group at the Systems Biology Laboratories, pointed
out that Crick “managed scientiﬁc directions . by inﬂuencing all
the people and telling them his ideas, and what he thought was
important, and what other people should do. He was hugely
inﬂuential in that way.”74
Further, he helped establish a dense mesh of interdisciplinary
collaborations, in the neurosciences broadly conceived, across
South-Californian research institutions.
A notable example of the sort of semi-institutional gath-
ering through which such collaborations developed was the
Helmholtz Club, which ran from 1982 into the 2000s. Oper-
ating from UC Irvine, with participants from various research
centres and from research ﬁelds as diverse as neuroanatomy,
neurophysiology, psychophysics, computer science and engi-
neering, the Helmholtz Club brought together scientists who
shared an interest in the visual system and in higher cognitive
functions that rely on visual perception, such as visual con-
sciousness. Crick was its co-founder, patron and a core
member for over twenty years. In a previous historical study, I
have demonstrated his lasting inﬂuence over the club, the
wide array of uses that such a gathering can serve when
skilfully organized, and its role as a metaphorical greenhouse
where a new research programme can take root and eventu-
ally ﬂourish. In the case of the Helmholtz Club, these uses cut
across the epistemological, social and political dimensions of
science (Aicardi, 2014). Indeed, I would venture that this
particular semi-institutional gathering played a key role in
three huge and apparently inevitable developments: the
framing of current ‘big brain’ projects like the American BRAIN
Initiative and the European Human Brain Project within the
paradigm of computational neuroscience, the key role of
neural networks simulation platforms in current research, and
the vision of neuromorphic hardware as a privileged physical
support for brain models.69 The Salk Institute laboratories are listed at http://www.salk.edu/faculty/
laboratories.html, consulted 09/11/2014.
70 http://www.salk.edu/faculty/stevens.html, last consulted 18/06/2015.
71 http://www.salk.edu/faculty/albright.html, last consulted 18/06/2015.
72 http://inc.ucsd.edu/people.html, last consulted 04/05/2015.
73 InsideSalk newsletter, August 2013, ‘Neuroscientist Terry Sejnowksi attends
White House announcement of collaborative BRAIN Initiative,’ http://www.salk.
edu/insidesalk/articlenin.php?id¼429, consulted 09/11/2014.
74 Ed Callaway, personal communication, 01/10/2012.4. Concluding remarks
The institutional ediﬁce of science relies explicitly on stan-
dards of evaluation that are mostly limited to citation counts,
publication records and individual awards. Yet ethnographies of
science over three decades have taught us that doing science day-
in day-out is a highly social and collective pursuit, that it can take
place in a diverse array of spaces and can involve all sorts of
activities.75 In many scientists’ memories, such activities are not
central to, or even a part at all, of ‘doing science’; they hardly ever
emphasize these aspects of their work, in contrast to their
research interests and results, far more important to them. Still,
questioning memory work, and thus questioning how central to
doing science these supposedly peripheral activities actually are,
is part of the historian’s job.76 This, in turn, has important im-
plications for notions of ‘success’ and ‘failure’ in science, as
questioning the scope, and relative weight, of the activities that
count towards ‘doing science’ challenges the accepted institu-
tional standards of evaluation.
The received wisdom about Crick’s long engagement with the
neurosciences is that he did not make any signiﬁcant breakthrough
on the major problems he set out to solve and should thus be
counted a failure. In the present essay, I have argued that cross-
worlds inﬂuencing was part of ‘doing science’ and in this light, I
have shown that Crick’s contributions to the neurosciences may
have been severely underestimated, and merit serious scholarly
investigation. Approaching Crick as a ‘cross-worlds inﬂuencer’
makes it possible to view his diverse career as a coherent whole,
giving new, politically-charged signiﬁcance to a course of actions
that could otherwise seem inconsistent and dispersed. It also shows
how valuable the concept of cross-worlds inﬂuencer can be for
pursuing the political dimension of ‘doing science’. In particular, it
puts more weight on individual agency than the concepts of ‘go-
between’, ‘broker’, or ‘bridge scientist’77, which all emphasize the
intermediary role that these ﬁgures play but underplay their role in
steering and shaping scientiﬁc developments.
To conclude, I would like to address an issue that I have left
hanging, namely the question of why it matters to relate Crick’s
activities in his various ﬁelds of research to his life-deﬁning ‘anti-
vitalism’. It matters ﬁrst from a historiographical perspective,
because it gives a new and consistent perspective on Crick’s diverse
career, which, if I follow Thomas Hankins’ defence of biography in
history of science, should be a major aim for scientiﬁc biography
(Hankins, 1979, p. 8). But more importantly, it matters because
Crick’s self-constructed anti-vitalism encapsulates the speciﬁc
worldview that he carried across ﬁelds. This, in turn, motivated him
to inﬂuence the conditions under which interdisciplinary collabo-
rations could take shape, privileging the possibilities of certain
interdisciplinary hybrids which he saw as congruent with his ‘anti-
vitalism,’ while rejecting others. One example, in the early days of
the Salk Institute, was Crick’s opposition to Warren Weaver’s pro-
posal to have an evolutionist like Ernst Mayr or George Gaylord
Simpson join as a Resident Fellow, which he justiﬁed on the
grounds that an evolutionist biologist would simply not ﬁt with the
existing Resident Fellows, and not see ‘eye to eye’with (some of. )
the Non-Resident fellows (Olby, 2009, p. 373).75 Here is a subjective selection among the very many references available,
covering a wide range of topics and styles: Latour & Woolgar (1986), Traweek
(1988), Helmreich (1998), Collins (2004), Dumit (2004).
76 For discussions in historiography of contemporary science and technology
about the conﬂicts that may arise between retrospective memories and documents
written at the time of the events taking place, see Gaudillière (1997) and Hoddeson
(2006).
77 The concept of the ‘bridge scientist’ is developed in Anbar (1986).
C. Aicardi / Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 55 (2016) 83e9594In summary, the present study, together withmy previous study
of the Helmholtz Club and Crick’s role in it (Aicardi, 2014), shows
how historians can use cross-worlds inﬂuencers as guides into the
thickets of contemporary big bioscience. By following Crick in this
role, one can navigate semi-institutional networks that cut across
many research ﬁelds, funding and policymaking bodies, and in-
stitutions. Like one of García-Sancho’s administrators, Crick played
an inﬂuential role (if self-imposed and self-constructedwhen theirs
was part of the job description) brokering and establishing trust
between distinct research communities and building-up in-
stitutions. I would like to propose that more generally, ‘following
the cross-worlds inﬂuencers’ may be a fruitful heuristic for histo-
rians probing the rhizomic and genealogic entanglements of
modern big bioscience.Acknowledgements
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